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Oceans Report
BURT L. SAUNDERS*
I. INTRODUCTION

The first part of the Ninth Session of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) convened in New York
City, New York, on March 3, 1980. The largest number of states,
152, since the beginning of the conference in 1973, participated in
this session. This was considered by many as an indication of the
tremendous progress that has been made towards the resolution of all
outstanding "hardcore" issues, as well as an indication that the conference work was rapidly being concluded.
At the final meeting of the conference on April 4, 1980, the conference agreed on a timetable for the resumption of the Ninth Session
in Geneva. The schedule called for the completion of negotiations on
unsettled issues within the first two weeks of the resumed Ninth Session. The third week was to be devoted to a general debate, at which
time delegations would be able to comment on the entire range of
issues covered in the draft convention and would be able to address
specific suggestions for change. It was hoped that during the third
week in Geneva, another revision of the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (ICNT) would be prepared. Conference President
H. Shirley Amerasinghe suggested that this new text be called a
"Basic Proposal" to which delegations would be permitted to introduce formal amendments no later than the second day of the fifth
week of the resumed session. Adherence to this schedule would permit a draft convention to be adopted by the conference and signed in
Caracas in 1981.1
Though there has been much progress towards resolution of the
so-called "hardcore" issues during the last two years of debate, many
intractable issues remain, such as the delimitation of maritime boundaries between opposite and adjacent States, composition of and voting
on the Council, and the function and operation of the Preparatory
Commission pending implementation of the treaty. These must be
settled prior to the successful completion of negotiations by the con-

* LL.M. 1979, University of Miami School of Law; J.D. 1975, William and
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Florida, and has attended several sessions of the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea as a representative of various non-governmental agencies.
1. See U.N. Doe. SEA/396 (April 4, 1980).
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ference. In addition to the conclusion of substantive negotiations, the
delegates must come to grips with the issues of amendments, reservations, the relation of the treaty to other conventions, entry into force,
transitional provisions, denunciation, and participation in the conference. 2 All of these have been debated and discussed at length, but
none have been fully resolved.
Many conference participants fully realize the damage that could
result from a prolonged and extensive amendment, reservation and
denunciation process. At the same time, delegates realize that it is
not politically feasible to eliminate all amendments and reservations,
and that some abbreviated procedure must be developed for them.
The greatest fear is that some delegations may demand a section-bysection vote and debate prior to acceptance of a draft convention.
This could result in a prolonged process of amendments and reservations that could destroy the "package deal" concept of this convention, thus undermining the overall goal of the convention to develop
a uniform and comprehensive law of the sea.
Potentially complicating this situation is the new Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980. 3 Many developing States,
primarily those in the Group of 77,4 see this as a threat to the delicate balance achieved thus far. As discussed infra, however, this
should not pose a serious roadbloack to continued progress.
II. STATUS OF THE UNCLOS NEGOTIATIONS

As during the last several sessions of the Conference, the issues
requiring the most extensive debate were deep seabed mining, voting
on and composition of the international Council, delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between adjacent and opposite States, and marine
scientific research. With the issuance of Revision II of the Informal

2. The specific task of the Preparatory Commission is to prepare for the establishment of the International Seabed Authority and its various organs. It is likely to
be a number of years between the date of acceptance by the negotiators of a Draft
Convention and its entry into force. The Preparatory Commission is to begin the
process of rule-making and preparation for the establishment of the Authority and its
associated organs.
3. The Act establishes a mechanism for the regulation of the exploration and
exploitation of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed area, beyond the jurisdiction of any nation.
4. As a means of facilitating negotiations various special interest groups were
formed. One such group was the group of developing States, now composed of over
100 States and referred to as the Group of 77.
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Composite Negotiating Text 5 (hereinafter referred to as the INCT/
Rev. 2), final substantive negotiations should be completed in 1980.
The provisions contained in the ICNT/Rev. 2, concerning the above
issues, are an improvement over the ICNT/Rev. 1,6 and provide a
significantly improved prospect of consensus and should serve as the
framework of an acceptable comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty.
The most significant changes are those dealing with the Committee I deep seabed mining issues. The moratorium provision in former
Article 155 was very troubling to deep seabed mining industries. It
empowered the Assembly to impose a moratorium on mining activities after twenty-five years from the implementation of the Treaty
if the review conference fails to reach an agreement on the system of
exploration and exploitation. The moratorium provision has been deleted, and Article 155(5) now provides that if within five years of the
commencement of the review conference no agreement is reached on
the system of exploration and exploitation, the conference may decide
by a two-thirds majority vote of the States Parties to the Convention
to adopt amendments to the system as necessary. Though review of
the system of exploration and exploitation is assured, deep seabed
mining industries are now also assured that no moratorium will be
7
imposed pending the results of the review conference.
A second area in which significant progress has been made is the
transfer of technology provisions of Annex 3, Article 5. Article 5 now
provides that when submitting a proposed plan of work, applicants
are to make available to the Authority a general description of the
equipment and methods to be used. It is made clear, however, that
this is to be non-proprietary information. Article 5 also provides that
the obligation to transfer technology be made a condition of every
contract for the conduct of activities in the Area. 8
If the Authority so requests, operators are obliged to make available to the Enterprise, on fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions, the technology which is used by the operator in the international Area, and which he is legally entitled to transfer. "This
commitment may be invoked only if the Enterprise finds that it is
5. The ICNT/Rev. 2 was distributed shortly after the close of negotiations in
New York. See U.N. Document A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 2 (April 11, 1980).
6. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.lO/Rev. 1 (1979). Section 155 establishes the Review Conference and provides the mechanism for amending the system of exploration
and exploitation of the international Area.
7. See ICNT/Rev, 2, Annex 3, art. 5 (1980).
8. The Area is defined as "'the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
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unable to obtain the same or equally efficient and useful technology
on the open-market and on fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions." 9 Article 5 also provides that technology that cannot be
legally transferred is not to be used by the operator in the Area.
Article 5, Section 3(b) provides that an operator is:
To obtain a written assurance from the owner of any technology
not covered under subparagraph (a) that the operator uses in carrying out activities in the Area and which is not generally available
on the open market that the owner will, if and when the Authority
so requests, make available to the Enterprise to the same extent as
made available to the operator, that technology under license of
other appropriate arrangements and on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. If such assurance is not obtained, the
technology in question shall not be used by the operator in carrying out activities in the Area. This assurance shall be made legally
binding and enforceable whenever it is possible to do so without
additional cost to the contractor.' 0
Operators are required to take all feasible measures to acquire
the legal right to transfer technology that the operator is not legally
entitled to transfer, and which is not generally available on the open
market. If there is a close corporate relationship between the
operator and the owner of the technology, and the operator refuses to
transfer such technology, then his failure to do so shall be considered
relevant to the contractor's qualifications for subsequent contracts.
Additionally, the Enterprise is authorized to negotiate directly with
the owner of the technology rather than through a contract with the
operator. The blacklisting provisions of the ICNT/Rev. 2 11 to prevent
this type of refusal are eliminated. Now there is an obligation on
States Parties having access to such technology to ensure its transfer
on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. 12 Paragraph
7 now provides that the obligation of operators to transfer technology
may be invoked until ten years after the Enterprise has begun commercial production. Earlier drafts containing no such time limitation
on the obligation to transfer technology were troublesome to mining
industries.

9. See ICNT/Rev. 2, Annex 3, art. 5 (1980).
10. Id.
11. To prevent the unlikely situation where a contractor might refuse to transfer
technology to the Enterprise, the ICNT/Rev. I contained a blacklisting provision,
whereby such a contractor could not use such technology in the mining operation.
See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 1, Annex 3, art. 5 (1979).
5 (1980).
12. ICNT/Rev. 2, Annex 3, art. 5,
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Much progress is also evident in the new technology transfer
dispute settlement procedures in Article 5, Annex 3. The dispute settlement mechanisms are greatly simplified. Disputes are now subject
to compulsory procedures in accordance with Part II. Questions as to
whether technology transfer offers are within the range of what are
fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions may now be
submitted by either party to binding commercial arbitration. 1 3 Finally, to clarify an operator's transfer obligations, paragraph 8 defines
technology as "the specialized equipment and technical know-how,
including manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and technical advice and assistance, necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a viable system and the legal right to use these items for that
purpose on a non-exclusive basis. "
These provisions provide a greatly improved prospect of consensus. They are more effective in assuring that needed technology is
transferred to the Enterprise. According to the United States Delegation Report, 14 however, the United States and many other developed
countries find some difficulties with paragraph 3(e) which requires an
operator to transfer to a developing State the technology that is required to be transferred to the Enterprise in the event that the developing State has applied for a contract. It is stipulated in paragraph
3(e) that this transfer of technology is not to involve a transfer of
technology to a third State or its nationals. Though this provision is
troublesome, it is one that the United States and other developed
countries can live with.
Most of the provisions dealing with financial arrangements that
were negotiated during the resumed Eighth Session remain substantially intact. The same is true for those provisions dealing with the
financing of the Enterprise. However, in reference to financing the
Enterprise, there are several defects which may be considered major
by developed States. Chief among these is the procedure to be followed in the event that some States do not become parties to the
Convention. It is provided that developed States are to provide
financing to the Enterprise and a schedule of the amounts required
from each is to be specified in the rules and regulations of the Authority to be drafted by the Preparatory Commission prior to the
ratification process. In the event that certain States do not become
parties or they do not adhere to the provisions of the convention,
13. Id. at 4.
14. See U.S. Delegation Report, Ninth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, February 27-April 4, 1980, at 21-23.
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other States may find that the amount of their obligation towards
financing of the Enterprise would be greatly increased. The new text
provides that there may be additional assessments in the event of
insufficient funds for the above reasons, but such additional assessments are limited to a total of twenty-five percent (25%) of the cost of
one fully integrated project, and these costs are to be apportioned on
the United Nation's scale of assessments. The current text also requires States to make a decision on whether to ratify the convention
without complete knowledge as to what the repayment schedule of
the interest-free loans will be. According to the United States delegation, both these defects must be considered major and must be resolved in future negotiations. 15
As in the past, one of the most troubling issues deals with the
composition of, and voting on, the Council. The text found in
ICNT/Rev. I is maintained in the second revision even though this is
not considered an acceptable procedure. It is clear that the United
States and other developed nations whose nationals will engage in
deep seabed mining activities will not agree to a voting mechanism
on the Council under which their interests would not be adequately
represented. These nations continue to insist that they must be able
to prevent decisions in the Council that are adverse to their major
economic interests, and that there must be a mechanism to prevent
discriminatory actions by the Council. Closely associated with the
question of voting on the Council is the question of composition of the
Council. Little debate took place concerning this issue, and it is felt
that this question will also present continued difficulties for the
negotiators. 16
Substantive negotiations in Committee II, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Andres Aguilar, of Venezuela, focused primarily
on the definition of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the question of payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline and
revenue sharing of the wealth recovered therefrom (Negotiating
Group 6), the delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent
and opposite states, and the settlement of delimitation disputes
(Negotiating Group 7). The Committee II text incorporated in the
ICNT/Rev. 2 is substantially complete and offers a significant improvement over the provisions in the first revision of the ICNT. On
the question of the definition of the outer limits of the continental
15. Id. at 23.
16. See supra note 2.
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shelf, the Chairman of Committee II recommends an addition to
paragraph 5 providing that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine
ridges the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such
17
as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.
This recommendation is incorporated in Revision 2 as paragraph
6 of Article 76. Paragraph 7 provides that the coastal state must delineate where its shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from its
baseline. The commission on the limits of the continental shelf, pursuant to paragraph 8, "shall make recommendations to coastal states
on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their
continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by the coastal
state taking into account these recommendations shall be final and
binding.'" I
Article 82, dealing with payments and contributions with respect
to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles,
is essentially the same as found in the ICNT/Rev. 2. The sharing of
revenues from resources recovered beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baseline, presents several questions. It is important that the
amount to be paid to the international community, through the international Authority, is not so great as to discourage exploitation and
exploration of those resources. Paragraph 2 of Article 82 sets out the
rate to be charged to the States Parties that are obligated to share the
revenues from those resources. Paragraph 3 provides that a developing State which is a net importer of those resources is exempt from
making such payments to the international Authority.
The questions of who must pay and who is entitled to receive
those payments must be addressed. This is a difficult issue for both
developed and developing States since it appears likely that both will
have to contribute to the Authority under Article 82. This fact tends
to eliminate the ideological arguments that are evident in the discussions dealing with the resources of the deep seabed, and reduces
these arguments to primarily economic ones. This situation should
facilitate reaching agreement to some degree. The negotiations are

17. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.51 (March 29, 1980) at 2.
18. See ICNT/Rev. 2, art. 76 (1980).
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already substantially complete and the proposed articles should command wide-spread support.
One of the most difficult issues faced in any international negotiation is the question of delimitating boundaries. The question of delimitation of maritime boundaries is no exception to that rule. In
order for compromise solutions to be accepted States Parties must be
willing to compromise their positions regarding the marine territory
that is to be included within the confines of their contintental
shelves. The same is true for the delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone between opposite and adjacent States. If one opposite
or adjacent State perceives that it is gaining territory, then there is
certainly going to be another opposite or adjacent State that feels that
it is giving up territory. This makes the negotiations on the delimitation of maritime boundaries extremely difficult.
Closely associated with this difficult issue is the issue of dispute
settlement on questions of delimitation of maritime boundaries. It is
extremely difficult to negotiate a compulsory boundary dispute settlement mechanism in a treaty such as this. Because the provisions of
the ICNT/Rev. I could not form the basis of a consensus, the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7, Chairman Manner of Finland, offered
the following as an attempt to work towards consensus:
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement in conformity
with international law. Such an agreement shall be in accordance
with equitable principles, employing the median or equidistance
line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances
prevailing in the area concerned. 19
The reference in Article 83 to an agreement in conformance with international law is characteristic of an attempt by the negotiators to
delay the finalization of provisions that have proved to be unsolvable.
Therefore, the delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite
and adjacent states will be delayed until a time after Treaty ratification.
The Third Committee, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador
A. Yankow, of Bulgaria, concentrated its efforts on marine scientific
research. According to the Chairman, the main problem areas are the
legal regime for the conduct of scientific research on the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline, the suspension of

19. ICNT/Rev. 2, art. 83 (1980).
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cessation of such research activities, and the settlement of disputes
relating to the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of
the Convention. The rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States with regard to marine scientific research were also
addressed. According to the Chairman, the Third Committee made
substantial progress in all of those areas; on all outstanding issues, the
negotiations resulted in compromise proposals on which consensus
has been achieved. Accordingly, the Chairman concluded that the
Third Committee completed its consideration of Part 13 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text on marine scientific research. 20
According to the United States Delegation, marine scientific research beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline on the continental
shelf is the most contentious of all issues addressed by the Third
Committee. Article 246, paragraph 2, provides that "marine scientific
research activities in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State."
Paragraph 5 of Article 246 delineates the circumstances under which
a coastal State may properly refuse to permit the conduct of the
marine scientific research in its exclusive economic zone, or on its
continental shelf. The coastal State may withhold its consent if the
project: (a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation
of natural resources; (b) involves drilling into the continental shelf,
the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into
the environment; (c) involves the construction, operation or use of
artificial islands, installations and structures; (d) contains information
regarding the nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate;
or (e) the researching State has outstanding obligations to the coastal
State to provide information under Article 248. However, pursuant to
paragraph 6, a coastal State cannot exercise its discretion under subparagraph (a) to withhold consent where the project is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources and
21
the project is beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline.
Most substantive issues have been debated at length and equitable compromise solutions have been reached. Though tough negotiations still remain, the spirit and will to succeed should provide the
impetus to conclude negotiations on the few remaining hard-core issues. Procedural questions concerning ratification, amendments, reservations, denunciations, and entry into force still remain and pose
the most difficult problems for the future of UNCLOS.
20. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.50 (March 28, 1980).
21. ICNT/Rev. 2, art. 246 (1980).
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III.

THE UNITED

SEABED

MINING

STATES'

DEEP

LEGISLATION

A. Introduction
In June 1980, President Carter signed into law the much awaited
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 22 (hereinafter referred to
as the Act). The expressed purpose of the Act is to encourage the
successful conclusion of a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty.
Pending ratification of the comprehensive Treaty, however, and prior
to its entry into force with respect to the United States, this Act is to
provide "an interim program to regulate the exploration for and
commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed by
23
United States citizens."
It is clear from even a casual reading of the Act that the drafters
were conscious of the delicate negotiations currently being conducted
by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Congress is
fully aware of the significance to the world's developing nations (the
so-called Group of 77) of the legal regime that is being negotiated by
the United Nations Conference. The concept of the "common heritage of mankind", as far as the developing nations of the world are
concerned, is a clear expression of existing customary international
law. Spokesmen for these nations have stressed over and over during
the United Nations debate that any exploration or exploitation of the
international area that is not conducted pursuant to a license from an
international "authority" representing all of the world's nations would
be a clear violation of international law. Moreover, such violators
would be considered international outlaws, according to the Group of
77. They have frequently stressed that enactment of unilateral legislation by the United States, or any other nation, and the activities conducted by nationals of those nations pursuant thereto, would greatly
jeopardize the delicate balance that has been achieved thus far. Many
have predicted that such legislation and such activities would raise
world tensions to such a level that there would be no possibility of
success for the Conference.
Notwithstanding the Group of 77's position, the United States
Congress saw a need to enact this unilateral legislation. At the same
time, however, Congress has been very careful to assure the world
community that the legislation is only an interim procedure that

22. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of June 28, 1980, Pub. L. 96-283,
94 Stat. 553 (1980).
23. Id. at § 2(b)(3).
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would give way to any international treaty that becomes effective as
to the United States. This raises several questions; such as what happens if United States nationals obtain mining rights and begin commercial activities in a particular area pursuant to this Act, and subsequently, the United States becomes a party to an international Law
of the Sea Treaty. This also raises the question of what would happen
if the general world community adopts such a Treaty, but the United
States does not become a party. This, of course, would raise an additional interesting question since the United States has adopted in
principle the concept of the "common heritage of mankind," but
would be in a position of permitting its nationals to conduct activities
in the international area that would appear to be in conflict with that
concept. In order to better understand the significance of the Act and
its possible impact upon the current United Nations' negotiations, an
analysis of the major provisions follows.
B. Intent of Congress
In section 2(a) of the Act, Congress finds that it is in the national
interest of the United States to ensure the availability of certain hard
mineral resources, such as those found within the international area.
Though the United Nations Conference appears to be nearing the
end of the protracted negotiations, it is likely to be many years before
a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty becomes effective as to the
United States, and thus Congress finds "legislation is required to establish an interim legal regime under which technology can be developed in the exploration and recovery of the hard mineral resources
of the deep seabed can take place until such time as a Law of the Sea
Treaty enters into force with respect to the United States."24
Further, pending entry into force of such a Treaty, and absent any
other international agreement, the existing uncertainty among potential deep seabed mining industries as to what the future legal regime
is likely to be will discourage or prevent the investments that are
necessary to develop deep seabed mining technology.
Congress further finds that the United States supported the
United Nations General Assembly resolution, which declared in part
that the mineral resources of the deep seabed area are the "common
heritage of mankind," but did so "with the expectation that this principle would be legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive
international Law of the Sea Treaty yet to be agreed upon." 2 5 This
24. Id. at § 2(a)(16).
25. Id. at § 2(a)(7).
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may be an attempt by the United States to avoid being placed in the
position of violating international law. As justification for this legislation, the United States Congress further finds that "it is the legal
opinion of the United States that exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of
the high seas, subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interest of
other States in their exercise of those and other freedoms recognized
26
by general principles of international law."
It is clear from the expressed findings of Congress that the
United States is attempting to assure the world community that it is
not in violation of international law. The world community, however,
is not likely to accept the position that the "common heritage of mankind" was established with the expectation that that principle would
be further defined in a comprehensive treaty. It is the position of the
world community in general that the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" is an expression of customary international law,
whether or not it is further defined by any international treaty. Also,
it is clear that the world community, in particular the Group of 77,
will dispute the position of the United States that commercial recovery of hard mineral resources in the international area is a freedom of
the high seas.
In a further attempt to minimize the impact of this legislation
upon the current negotiations, Congress included a provision that establishes an international revenue sharing fund, the proceeds of
which are to be shared with the international community pursuant to
a Law of the Sea Treaty effective as to the United States. 2 7 There is
no indication within the Act as to how much money must be placed

26. Id. at § 2(a)(12).
27. Id., § 2(b)(2). Section 403 of the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Removal Tax
Act of 1979 creates the Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, and provides
that:
(d) Expenditures From Trust Fund-If an international deep seabed treaty is ratified by and in effect with respect to the United States on or
before the date of the enactment of this Act, amounts in the Trust
Fund shall be available, as provided by approriations Acts, for making
contributions required under such treaty for purposes of the sharing
among nations of the revenues from deep seabed mining. Nothing in
this subsection shall be deemed to authorize any program or other
activity not otherwise authorized by law.
(e) Use of Funds-If an international deep seabed treaty is not in effect
with respect to the United States on or before the date ten years after
the date of the enactment of this Act, amounts in the Trust Fund shall
be available for such purposes as Congress may hereafter provide by
law.
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in the fund, and this raises questions as to what would happen if the
international authority established by a comprehensive treaty were to
determine that the fund is not large enough. The United States also
clearly states that by the enactment of this Act, the United States is
only exercising jurisdiction over those United States citizens and vessels, and those foreign citizens and vessels, that are otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. Under the Act, the United
States does not "assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any areas or resources in the
deep seabed." ' 28 In section 3(b) the Secretary of State is encouraged
to negotiate a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty providing nondiscriminatory access to the mineral resources of the international
area for all nations, and which "gives legal definition to the principle
that the resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of
mankind." 29
It has been the position of the United States that the compromise positions that have been arrived at thus far by the United
Nations Conference are not expressions of existing customary international law, and can only become law if a comprehensive Law of the
Sea Treaty is adopted. As evidence of this, the United States Congress, in section 4 of the Act, retained many of the old definitions
that are clearly to be changed in the event that the comprehensive
Treaty becomes effective. The clearest example of this is the definition of the "Continental Shelf", which is defined in the Act as the
seabed and subsoil of submarine areas adjacent to the coast of a nation, but outside its territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or,
beyond that depth, to where the depth of the waters admits of the
30
exploitation of the natural resources of that area.
C. Provisions of the Act
The Act provides that to engage in exploration or commercial
recovery within the area, a United States citizen must have a license
or permit issued pursuant to the Act, a license or permit or equivalent authorization issued by a reciprocating state, or be authorized
pursuant to an international agreement in force with respect to the
United States. Section 102(b)(3) provides that a permit issued pursuant to the Act gives the holder of the permit the right to recover

28. Id.

at § 3(b).
29. Id. at § 3(c).
30. Id. at § 4(2).

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
mineral resources and to "own, transport, use, and sell minerals recovered under the permit."
It is noteworthy that the Act does not provide for exclusive ownership by deep seabed miners of the minerals in a particular area of
the deep seabed covered by their permit, prior to the recovery from
the seabed of those minerals. Though the Act does provide for certain
property rights in recovered minerals, it is questionable whether the
Act goes far enough to assure potential investors that a stable legal
regime for the international area is being established by the Act. Section 102(b)(2) does provide, however, that a license or permit issued
under the Act is exclusive with respect to the holder thereof, as
against all other United States citizens; and section 102(b)(4) provides
that in the event of interference with the exploration or commercial
recovery activities of a licensee or permittee by the nationals of other
States, "the Secretary of State shall use all peaceful means to resolve
the controversy by negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or resort to
agreed tribunals." 31 It is clear that the deep seabed mining industry
would prefer to have exclusive ownership of minerals in a designated
area, as opposed to ownership of recovered resources only. Nevertheless, it is believed that the combination of these provisions should be
sufficient to encourage deep seabed mining industries to commit the
necessary capital to develop technology and to continue the process of
exploration for mining sites.
Title II of the Act deals with transition to an international
agreement. Pursuant to section 201 of the Act, it is the expressed
intent of Congress that any international agreement must:
(A) provide assured and non-discriminatory access, under
reasonable terms and conditions, to the hard mineral resources of
the deep seabed ...
(B) provide security of tenure by recognizing the rights of the
United States citizens who have undertaken exploration or commercial recovery tinder title I before such agreement enters into
force with respect to the United States to continue their operation
under terms, conditions, and restrictions which do not impose significant new economic burdens upon such citizens with respect to
such operations with the effect of preventing the continuation of
32
such operations on a viable economic basis.

31. Id. at § 102(b)(4).
32. Id. at § 201(l)(A)-(B).
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D. Impact of the Act on the UNCLOS Negotiations
In determining whether an international agreement is in
conformance with the above, one must consider, among other things,
the discretionary powers granted to an international regulatory body,
the decision-making process of such body, the availability of impartial
and effective settlement of dispute mechanisms, and any other features that tend to discriminate against exploration and commercial recovery activities undertaken by United States citizens. It is further
the expressed intent of Congress that this Act is transitional only and
shall be effective only until the adoption of a comprehensive United
Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, or some other treaty that is effective
as to the United States. The provisions in Section 201 appear to be a
direct result of the difficult negotiations that have occurred concerning the make-up and voting on the proposed international council,
the powers and duties of the international authority, and the proposed economic provisions of Revision 2 of the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text.
Section 202 provides that the provisions of this Act that are not
inconsistent with any treaty effective as to the United States, shall
continue in effect with respect to United States citizens. In the event
of such an international treaty, the Secretary of State is directed to
"make every effort, to the maximum extent practicable consistent
with the provisions of that agreement, to provide for the continued
operation of exploration and commercial recovery activities undertaken by United States citizens prior to the entry into force of the
agreement.'" 3
Another provision of the Act which may have impact upon the
current United Nations negotiations is section 118 dealing with reciprocating States. A reciprocating State is defined as a foreign nation
that regulates its citizens and others subject to its jurisdiction engaged in exploration for and commercial recovery of deep seabed
mineral resources in a manner compatible with that provided in this
Act. It is further required that such foreign nation provide adequate
measures for the protection of the environment and that such nation
recognize "priorities of right, consistent with those provided in this
Act and the regulations issued under this Act, for applications for
licenses for exploration or permits for commercial recovery, which
applications are made either under its procedures or under this
Act." 34 Upon such designation, section 118 provides that there shall
33. Id. at § 202.

34. Id. at § 118(a)(3).
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be no license or permit issued under the Act permitting any activities
that are in conflict with any license, permit or equivalent authorization issued by a reciprocating foreign nation.
The Act provides for the issuance of permits and licenses and for
the review and amendment of those licenses and permits. Pursuant to
section 105, prior to the issuance of a license for exploration or a
permit for commercial recovery, the administrator must find that such
exploration or commercial recovery:
(1) will not unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the
freedoms of the high seas by other states, as recognized under
general principles of international law;
(2) will not conflict with any international obligation of theUnited States established by any treaty or international convention
in force with respect to the United States;
(3) will not create a situation which may reasonably be expected to lead to a breach of international peace and security involving armed conflict;
(4) cannot reasonably be expected to result in a significant adverse effect on the quality of the environment, taking into account
the analyses and information in any applicable environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to section 109(c) or 109(d); and
(5) will not pose an inordinate threat to the safety of life and
property at sea. 35
Section 109 of the Act provides extensive protections for the
marine environment. The Act directs the administrator to expand and
accelerate programs for assessing the effects on the environment from
commercial recovery activities, including processing at land and at
sea, so as to provide an assessment of the environmental impact of
such activities. Each license and permit issued under this Act shall
contain conditions and restrictions to ensure protection of the marine
environment. The Act provides for the preparation of a programmatic
environmental impact statement. An environmental impact statement
is required prior to the issuance of any permit or license since such
issuance is considered to be a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment under section 102 of the
36
National Environmental Policy Act of 19 6 9 .

35. Id. at § 105(a).
36. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. 4321 (1969).
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CONCLUSION

There are sure to be strong statements denouncing the unilateral
United States mining legislation at the remaining United Nations
negotiating sessions on the Law of the Sea. Though the United States
Congress was careful to ensure that the Act be viewed as only an
interim procedure, there are many provisions which are sure to provoke angry rebukes to the United States. Included among these are
the provisions in the Act that state that the concept of the "'common
heritage of mankind" is one that needs legal definition in a comprehensive international Treaty; and also those sections providing for
the protection of mining rights established pursuant to this Act.
It is felt by many, however, that the passage of this legislation
should have the effect of encouraging a more rapid conclusion to
negotiations since it is now clear that the United States and its nationals will engage in deep seabed mining with or without an international Law of the Sea Treaty. It is significant that the United States
Congress provided in section 102(c)(1)(d) that no exploration licenses
shall be issued prior to July 1, 1981, and no permit shall be issued
authorizing commercial recovery prior to January 1, 1988. The Act,
in effect, establishes a mechanism by which United States nationals,
and others subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, may engage in exploration after January 1, 1981, and may commence commercial operations after January 1, 1988. It also provides for the
orderly regulation of said activities. Now it is incumbent upon the
international community to conclude negotiations and begin the ratification process of an acceptable comprehensive international Law of
the Sea Treaty. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act
should provide the impetus for the rapid conclusion of this process.

